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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the United States patent system is to balance the goals of
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” with “. . . securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 1 Congress has enacted the patent statutes 2 in an effort to optimize the
public benefit of encouraging investment into research and development against the
social cost of granting to inventors exclusive rights to their inventions for 20 years. 3
As such, Congress has determined that an applicant must meet four criteria in order
to overcome the general public policy against the granting of a monopoly—even if
for only a limited time. First, the invention must have utility. 4 Second, the invention
must be novel. 5 Third, the invention must not be obvious in view of a person of
ordinary skill in the art. 6 Fourth, the invention must be fully described with

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2015).

3

See generally STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG. 2D SESSION, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM (1958) (Fritz Machlup).
4

35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, through Act 2015) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”).

5

35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West , through Act 2015) (“(a) Novelty; prior art.--A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless--(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in
a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed
published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be,
names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention....”).
6 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West, through Act 2015) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth
in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention
was made.”).
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specificity in an enabling disclosure. 7
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) has been
tasked by Congress with administering the day-to-day operation of examining patent
applications, issuing patents, and reexamining existing patents. In spite of this, the
historic practice has been that Congress and the courts have denied the Patent Office
the same rule making authority granted to other agencies under the Administrative
Procedures Act 8 to effectuate their mission. With the passage of the America
Invents Act 9 and the decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 10 the
Patent Office’s rule making authority makes a significant stride toward having the
ability to interpret congressional statutes and be given deference by the courts for
those interpretations similar to the deference given to other agencies. Although
courts are typically considered the final arbiters to say what the law is, 11 this
proposition is in doubt when administrative agencies are able to promulgate their
own rules; enforce those rules through agency actions; and adjudicate those cases in
administrative proceedings. Because the Court chose not to reign in the Patent
Office when it clearly went beyond its statutory authority, the courts are likely to
defer to the Patent Office’s interpretation of patent issues going forward. 12
This article explores the intersection of patent law and administrative rules,
and the role of both agencies and courts in divining legislative intent viewed through
a study of the decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. 13 First, this article
explores the historical practice the Patent Office has played in administering the
patent laws and the traditional view of Congress and the courts to deny the Patent
Office substantive rule making authority. Second, the origins of the Administrative
Procedures Act and how its subsequent application has affected Patent Office
practice is reviewed. This includes a discussion of the seminal Supreme Court case
interpreting the Administrative Procedures Act, because this seminal case, Chevron,

7

35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West, through Act 2015) (“(a) In general.—The specification shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out
the invention . . . . ”).
8

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2015).

9

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).

10

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).

11See

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

12

See infra part VII.

13

Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131.
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 14 was cited as controlling
precedent in deciding Cuozzo. Before moving onto an in-depth discussion of
Cuozzo, a comparison is made on one of the key points of contention in the case
between the Patent Office’s claim construction standard which uses the broadest
reasonable interpretation and the court’s claim construction standard which uses ‘as
understood by those skilled in the art.’ With this back drop the Supreme Court
decision in Cuozzo is discussed in detail. Lastly, an analysis of the impact of the
Cuozzo decision is made and an analysis of whether or not the courts will continue
to give deference to Patent Office interpretations of congressional intent or will
return the historical practice of leaving the interpretation of the core patent statutes
to the courts.
II. THE PATENT OFFICE HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN GRANTED ONLY A LIMITED
ABILITY TO PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES
Many of the principles and fundamental doctrines surrounding patent
rights were firmly established well before the Patent Office came into being. For
example, patent rights were granted throughout the colonies in the new world even
prior to the establishment of the federal patent system. 15 The ability of the United
States government to grant letters patent and copyrights were then subsequently
incorporated into the United States Constitution. 16 Initially, patents were granted
solely through an act of Congress and not through the executive branch. 17 This
quickly became overly cumbersome for Congress to decide on the merits of every
patent application. 18 Thus, Congress delegated this duty to the executive branch
through the first Patent Act of 1790. 19 The first Act spelled out in great detail how
the executive branch was to carry out its duties regarding patents including who
specifically was to examine the patent applications and how they were to decide
14

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

15

Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 615, 615-16 (1996).
16

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

17

The ability of a patent applicant to receive a patent through a private bill submitted to
congress is still available, but is rarely used anymore. See, e.g., Devin Dwyer, Looking for a
Bailout? Just Call Your Congressman, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/congress-private-laws-bailout-americans-specialcases/story?id=8995047.
18

P.J. Frederico, The Patent Act of 1793, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 77 (1936) (SPECIAL ISSUE).

19

Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
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which patents met the Act’s provisions. These specifics left very little discretion to
the executive branch as to how to administrate the patent system. This slowly
changed over time with Congress deferring more and more responsibility to the
executive branch in determining how best to administer the patent system at least
regarding internal procedural matters. This is illustrated by the subsequent history
of the Patent Office.
The first Patent Act passed in 1790 20 was replaced by a somewhat longer
and more detailed Act in 1793. 21 One of the first provisions to be changed was the
designation of who would be able to grant a patent. Because the process of
examination was so intensive, it did not make sense to burden top level cabinet
officials such as the Secretary of the Department of War with this work. 22 This
onerous examination process combined with the omission of the requirement of
“sufficiently useful” caused the patent system to effectively move from a patent
examination system to a patent registration system for a time. 23 Another change in
the Patent Act of 1793 gave the executive branch the discretion, without direct
congressional oversight, to appoint a Superintendent of the Patent Office. 24 As the
case load of patent examinations increased, the Patent Office eventually became a
separate agency under the Superintendent within the Department of State. 25
Nonetheless, a number of provisions from these early acts have survived in the
modern patent statutes to this day including: the patenting of inventions that were
not previously known or used; limiting patents to the first inventor; a system of
judicial remedies for infringement; and the requirement of disclosure. 26 As the
number of applications increased so did the need for the Patent Office to adopt
standard procedures for handling the increased workload.

20

Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting A
Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (1997).
21

Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).

22

Compare Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (“[I]t shall and may be lawful to and for
the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General, or
any two of them, if they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and
important, to cause letters patent to be made out.”), with Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793)
(“[I]t shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made
out.”); see Lawrence C. Kingsland, The United States Patent Office, 13 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 354–57
(Spring
1948),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol13/iss2/8.
23

Kingsland, supra note 22, at 357.

24

Id. at 358.

25

Id.

26

1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:18 (4th ed.) (Jan. 2016).
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These earlier Acts were repealed and replaced in 1836, and further added
to by the 1839 amendments, which introduced some new provisions to the
substantive patent laws at that time. 27 For example, one of the major changes was
to move away from the de facto patent registration system that had been established
back to an application and examination system where the Superintendent of the
Patent Office was to issue patents only to applications that met the statutory
requirement of validity. 28 This was done because many inventors were apparently
abusing the system by registering invalid patents as a means of asserting frivolous

27

Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).

28 Id. at sec. 7. For example, a letter sent by Mr. C. W. Peale illustrates the informal nature of
the registration system of patents prior to this change in a letter sent to William Thornton, the
Superintendent of the Patent Office during this time:

Dear Sir,
On my return form the head of the Chesapeake I find that my
son Rubens had received the papers respecting Mr. Hawkins’ Patent right
of the Polygraph and Physionotrace accompanied with your letter of the
27 Ult. For which please to accept my thanks—
I have further to request of you, that he enclosed transferred
right of the use of the Physiognotrace in the City of Philadelphia made to
me, may be recorded in the secretary of States Office and then to be
returned here immediately, with a certificate under the seal of office of
its being recorded. This ought to have been done sooner, which my want
of knowledge of the Law made me neglect, but my Lawer [sic] advises it
now, and wishes to have them before he commences the suit. I do not
love law suits, yet something must b3 [sic] done to prevent unjust men
from robing me of my privileges.
I contemplate a small Tour in Europe as soon as I can arrange
some family affairs, but most particularly to settle some exchanges with
the Paris Museum, and to dispose of a Skeleton of the mammoth, a
business my Son Rembrandt ought to have done before his return to
America. My respectful complements to the family, with due respect
your friend.

C W Peale
Papers relating to the administration of the U.S. Patent Office during the superintendency of
William Thornton, 1802–1828, (compiled and edited by C.M. Harris, Daniel Preston) (May
21, 1805).

28
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patent infringement claims. 29 In response, the Patent Office began to assert its
authority regarding various procedural matters. 30 One of the congressional
compromises in passing the Act introduced a new provision that allowed a grace
period in which patentees had to file a patent application before the invention was
deemed to have been abandoned and relegated to the public domain, rendering the
invention unpatentable. 31 During the ensuing years, the Superintendent of the Patent
Office title was replaced and changed to the Commissioner of the Patent Office and
the Patent Office began to promulgate its own procedural rules for examining patent
applications. 32
Additional substantive changes were introduced by Congress in the Patent
Act of 1870 including the requirement that an inventor disclose the best mode of
carrying out the invention 33 and including a change to the justification for the
presence of the grace period, from an inventor’s subjective abandonment to a system
based on laches. 34 The Patent Office introduced some additional changes of its own
during this time relating to how patents were to be examined internally. For
example, recognizing the imprecision in language, by applicants, in the language
being used when claiming an invention, the Patent Office now required peripheral
claiming rather than central claiming in order for the patent applicant to be

29

Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (“Exactions and frauds,
in all the forms which rapacity can suggest, are daily imposed and practised under the
pretence [sic] of some legal sanction. The most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in
common use are denominated improvements, and made pretexts for increasing their prices,
while all complaint and remonstrance are effectually resisted by an exhibition of the great
seal. . . . Impositions of this sort, are of common occurrence, and will continue to multiply
while the door to imposture is left open and unguarded.”).

30 See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 224 (1832) (“[T]he executive departments, it is
understood, have acted on the construction adopted by the circuit court, and have
considered it as settled. We would not willingly disregard the settled practice, in a case
where we are not satisfied it is contrary to law; and where we are satisfied it is required by
justice and good faith.”).
31 Patent Act of 1839, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
32

For example, the Commissioner of the Patent Office, at this time Edmund Burke,
submitted an opinion penned by the Secretary of State directly to the Supreme Court in
support of his examination decision. Bain v. Morse, 2 F. Cas. 394, 402 (C.C.D.D.C. 1849)
(“I have the honor to reply to your letter submitting an inquiry propounded by the
commissioner of patents.”).
33 Patent Act of 1870, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
34

See, e.g., The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 627, 627 (1887).
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successful. 35 Notably, the Act gave the Patent Office the explicit statutory authority
to promulgate its own rules for the first time, but limited the ability to only include
proceedings within the Patent Office. 36
The Patent Act of 1952 essentially codified the existing patent laws into
Title 35 of the United States Code. 37 One of the most significant changes to the
patent statutes was the express addition of the section regarding anticipation. 38 In
order to overcome the anticipation requirement for patentability, one’s invention
could not have been obvious to one skilled in the art. 39 Although the Patent Office
had some authority to promulgate its own rules, 40 many patent law issues remained
under Congress’s purview, including areas such as fee setting, where the agency
arguably was in a much better position than Congress to determine appropriate
fees. 41
In 1982, Congress enacted legislation to move appellate review for
infringement cases from the regional circuit courts of appeal to the newly formed
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 42 The new court was also granted
jurisdiction to take appeals directly from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 43 This allowed the same judicial
35 See 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:21 (4th ed.) (Jan. 2016); see, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853) (displaying both peripheral and central claiming styles). The Supreme
Court condoned the Patent Office’s change through a series of holdings. See, e.g., Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (“The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a
century in this country has reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magnitude of
the interests involved require accuracy, precision, and care in the preparation of all the papers
on which the patent is founded.”).
36 Patent Act of 1870, § 19 (1870) (“[The Commissioner], subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time establish rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of the proceedings in the patent office.”).
37

Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19, 1952).

38

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).

39

Id.

40

Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 6, 66 Stat. 792, 793 (July 19, 1952).

41

Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 41, 66 Stat. 792, 796 (July 19, 1952).

42 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982);
17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4101 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Bray v. United States, 785 F.2d 989, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(discussing merits of Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit).
43

17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
4104 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., In re Voss, 557 F.2d 812 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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body to now have judicial review of both infringement cases and review of the initial
administrative decision to grant a patent. 44 These review functions had been
judicially isolated for about 150 years and, thus, had diverged on some matters of
substantive law. 45
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg was one of the key decisions after
the establishment of the new Federal Circuit. 46 Although the Federal Circuit ruled
in favor of the USPTO the language the court used was actually seen to curtail the
Patent Office’s rule making authority. 47 This was explicitly emphasized in Merck &
Co. v. Kessler. 48 The court declined to accept the Patent Office Commissioner’s
argument that the office’s decision should be given “controlling weight” 49 under
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 50 and determined
that the Patent Office lacked the authority to promulgate any substantive rules. 51
Therefore, even though the Patent Office was given the authority to enact some
44

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at n.25.

45

See, e.g., In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the USPTO did
not use the legally correct method for determining obviousness); In re Donaldson Co., Inc.,
16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the USPTO imposed an improper
obviousness rejection).

46

See generally Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

47

Id. at 931. (“[T]he Commissioner's Notice falls within the ‘interpretative’ exception to the
section 553 public notice and comment procedures. Appellants thus have no standing to
assert Count I of the Complaint by reason of ‘procedural harm.’”); id. at 930. (“A
substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent
statutes, whether it be section 101, 102, 103, 112 or other section, does not fall within the
usual interpretation of such statutory language.”). It is this second statement that has since
been used by litigants in numerous cases seeking to circumscribe the Patent Office’s rule
making authority. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co.,
590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court and the Board's legal errors stem
from a failure to appreciate the consequences of the PTO's rulemaking authority. The PTO
lacks substantive rulemaking authority.”).
48 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
49
50

Id. at 1549.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

51 Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549 (quoting Atchison v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1994) (en
banc), aff'd, 516 U.S. 152 (1996)) (“As the Seventh Circuit recently had occasion to note,
however, ‘only statutory interpretations by agencies with rulemaking powers deserve
substantial deference.’”); id. at 1549–50 (“As we have previously held, the broadest of the
PTO's rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does not grant the
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.”); see also ANIMAL LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, 932 F.2d at 930.
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rules, this was narrowly interpreted by the courts to only apply to procedural matters
within the agency.
III. ORIGINS OF POST GRANT REVIEW OF PATENTS
Congress instituted a new proceeding in 1980, the ex parte reexamination,
to be administered by the Patent Office, because over the years a growing number
of complaints were being levied at the United States patent system. 52 In response,
Congress and the Patent Office began to try and address two of the major criticisms:
First, patents were being routinely granted for inventions that represented an
advance in the arts that was not significant enough to justify the resulting monopoly
as embodied in Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.; 53 As
the majority states:
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception
of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been
persistent. The Patent Office, like most administrative agencies,
has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of
discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has
placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents-gadgets that
obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of
advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this
Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of
devices . . . . The patent involved in the present case belongs to
this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has
spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this
one has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared
invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system
frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are
supposed to govern.”); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 542 (8th
Cir. 1972) (quoting statement of district court judge in record on
appeal: “I think you ought to tell your Attorney General, if he
wants to look at something, he ought to look at that Patent Office.
That has got to be the sickest institution that our Government has
ever invented. It is just, as far as I can see, an attritional war
between the patent applicant and the patent examiners, who
apparently get paid on the piece work for how many patents they
could put out. And you can examine for months some poor
fellows that are out doing business and finally arrive at a price
structure, and you might get an antitrust suit. But if you want to
look, go back and look in your Patent Office and see what is
52Kristen

Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Time for Corrective
Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217,
229–30 (2003).
53 SEE, E.G., Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156–
58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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happening to the Patent Office. I say that for the record and for
posterity. That has got to be the weakest link in the competitive
system in America.” 54
The second criticism addressed was that a large percentage of awarded
patents were being invalidated in litigation. 55 This first major attempt in
1980 was under taken to address these issues by Congress resulting in the
ability of third parties to raise the issue of a patent’s validity without filing
a lawsuit. 56 However, the ability to challenge an existing patent was
limited, because only ‘prior art’ invalidity and no other invalidating
activity would be considered, and secondly, because the reexamination was
essentially an ex parte proceeding. 57 Therefore, there was still a lot of
discord among the patent bar, and as such “reexamination, according to
many, has failed”. 58 In 1999, Congress then amended the act to add another
post-issuance review proceeding—the inter partes reexamination. 59 This
amendment allowed the requesting third party to have some ability to
participate in the proceeding after a reexamination had been instituted by
the Patent Office. 60
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was enacted in 2011. 61 Three major
54 SEE, E.G., Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156–
58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
55 See, e.g., Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have been
granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office.
But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally
strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is
one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”).
56 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (Dec. 12, 1980).
57

See id. The patent office would only reexamine the issued patent based on the existence of
prior art that was either an existing patent or printed publication at the time of invention.
Additionally, a third party after filing the initial claim could no longer participate in the
proceedings (i.e. they could not respond to any patentee arguments).

58

See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (1997) (stating that “a
lingering debate has centered around” the question of what role the PTO should “play in
regards to issued patents”).
59 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113, § 4608(a), 113 Stat 1501 (Nov. 29. 1999).
60 See id. The third-party requestor could now respond to the patentee’s arguments presented
to the patent office.
61 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16,
2011).
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changes were made by the America Invents Act: (1) moving from a first-to-invent
system to a first invento- to-file system; (2) giving the Patent Office fee-setting
authority; and (3) upgrading the administrative proceedings within the Patent
Office, which can be used to challenge patent validity after it has issued 62 Although
formal review by the patent office of a patent that had already issued had been
around since 1980 in the form of an ex parte reexamination, 63 this process was
expanded even further by the America Invents Act. 64 The new proceedings included
the post grant review, inter partes review, and covered business methods. Of
specific interest in this article is the inter partes review proceeding, which is
typically initiated by a third party who makes a claim of invalidity on an existing
patent. 65 The Patent Office reviews the claim(s) of the third party and then makes
an initial determination of whether or not to institute an inter partes review
proceeding. 66 Congress gave the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority
under the America Invents Act regarding fee-setting 67 and implementing the new
review proceedings. 68
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
As the U.S. government has grown, so too has the need for Congress to
delegate more authority to the executive branch to carry out its policies. This
transition was especially evident during the New Deal Era. 69 At the same time,
concerns about the substantive powers and policy objectives given to the executive

62

See generally ALAN J. KASPER
PRACTICE 1-6 (2016).

ET AL.,

PATENTS AFTER

THE

AIA: EVOLVING LAW

AND

63 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (Dec. 12, 1980) (establishing a formal process for
ex parte reexamination).
64 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept.
16, 2011).
65

35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013).

66

35 U.S.C. § 314 (2013).

67

Memorandum from Bernard J. Knight, Jr., Gen. Counsel, USPTO, Patent Fee Setting (Feb.
10, 2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/fee_setting
_opinion.pdf (“[Section 10 of the America Invents Act] provides the [Patent Office] with the
authority to set individual fees based on policy considerations.”).

68

69

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015).

Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 207 (2016).
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branch agencies began to surface. 70 The lack of disclosure from executive branch
agencies exacerbated concerns about insufficient oversight of agency decisionmaking procedures. 71
Eventually, the Administrative Procedures Act 72 was passed in 1946 after much
debate. 73 The purposes of the Act were to:
(1) To require agencies to keep the public informed of their
organization, procedures, and rules; (2) To provide for public
participation in the informal rulemaking process; (3) To prescribe
uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and
adjudicative proceedings, i.e., proceedings that are required by
statute to be made on the record after an agency hearing; and (4)
To restate the law of judicial review. 74
The Administrative Procedures Act has set the standards under which
agencies promulgate regulations, defined the scope of those regulations, and set
forth the circumstances under which they are subjected to judicial review. 75 Even in
the early years of the Administrative Procedures Act, courts deferred to the agencies
expertise and reversed agency decisions only rarely. 76 Over time, the Administrative
Procedures Act began to morph as judges made changes through judicial review and
Congress would respond with changes when writing the procedural provisions for
new agency statutes. 77 Then, the Court’s decision in Chevron reset judicial review
back to a position of general deference to administrative agencies. 78
Interestingly, the courts have historically declined to give the Patent Office
70

Id. at 209.

71 Id. at 209 (citing John Joseph Wallis, The Political Economy of New Deal Federalism, 29
ECON. INQUIRY 510 (July 1991) (“When Congress asked Harry Hopkins, head of the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration in the early New Deal era, to explain how he
made his decisions and to identify the criteria he used to allocate funds, he simply declined
to answer.”).
72 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2011).
73

Elias, supra, note 69 at 211–12.

74Jill
75

Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act, 85 MICH. B.J. 38, 39 (Nov. 2006).

Id.

76

Martin Shapiro, Golden Anniversary: The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, A, 19
REGULATION 40, 42 (1996), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/379.

77

Id. at 42-43 (This reflects the change in public perception regarding Administrative
Agencies. “Once viewed as benevolent, political eunuchs in white coats, scientists came to
be seen as part of ‘big science,’ an interest group with its hand out for big public funding and
part of the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower denounced.”).
78

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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Chevron deference afforded to other administrative agencies, such as the EPA and
FCC, without much explanation. 79 However, the Supreme Court has on occasion
chastised the Federal Circuit for substituting its interpretation of certain
administrative rules and evidentiary standards in place of those of the Patent
Office. 80 In Dickinson, the Federal Circuit found that the Patent Office’s factual
findings were “clearly erroneous.” 81 The Supreme Court held that the Federal
Circuit was not justified in substituting the court’s evidentiary standard for the
Patent Office’s standard under the Administrative Procedures Act and remanded the
case for rehearing using the agency’s standard. 82
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the American Inventors Protection Act
to reinforce that decision. 83 The specific language used by Congress in the Act
suggests that they intended to grant substantive rule making authority to the Patent
Office. 84 Even so, the Federal Circuit has continued to make the distinction between
procedural and substantive rules and deciding the cases based on this distinction. 85
This distinction was anything but clear as illustrated by Tafas v. Doll. 86 Judge Prost,
writing for the majority, held that the rules in question were procedural. 87 Judge
Radar disagreed and said the rules were substantive. 88 Judge Bryson opined that this
distinction was not helpful and held only that the rules under discussion here were

79

Compare Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996), with Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

80
81

See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999).
Id.

82 Id. at 165 (“Neither the Circuit nor its supporting amici, however, have explained
convincingly why direct review of the PTO's patent denials demands a stricter fact-related
review standard than is applicable to other agencies. Congress has set forth the appropriate
standard in the [Administrative Procedures Act].”).
83 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4711-4712, 113 Stat. 1501A552, at 1501A-572 to 1501A-575 (1999) (stating that, “establish[ing] regulations, not
inconsistent with law, which--(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office . .
.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2012) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations to provide
for the continued examination of applications for patent at the request of the applicant.”).
84 See generally Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 831, 857–62 (2012).
85 See, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1354-56 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
86

Id.

87 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (“While we do not purport to set forth a
definitive rule for distinguishing between substance and procedure in this case, we conclude
that the Final Rules challenged in this case are procedural.”), reh'g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
88 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1371 (Fed. Cir.) (Radar, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The Final Rules are substantive. The Final Rules affect individual
rights and obligations, and mark a startling change in existing law and patent policy.”),
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the sort congress had in mind when constructing the rule making statutes that applied
to the Patent Office. 89 The incongruous opinions penned in Tafas attracted the
attention of the full circuit who agreed to rehear the case en banc. However, the
new Director of the Patent Office rescinded the rules in question before the
rehearing, resulting in the court dismissing the appeal as moot. 90
A. Judicial Review of the Administrative Procedures Act
One of the seminal judicial decisions interpreting the Act was laid out in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 91 In Chevron, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated rules associated with the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 92 This required the EPA to institute a strict
permitting scheme for “nonattainment” states who had not achieved the desired
national air quality standards pursuant to previous legislation. 93 In contention was
the definition of the term ‘stationary source.’ Specifically, the EPA allowed a state
to apply the term on a plantwide basis. 94 Thus, a plant could add additional sources
of pollution without going through the permitting process as long as the total
pollution emitted from the plant remain unchanged. 95
The first question addressed by the Chevron court was whether Congress
had specifically spoken to the issue. If Congress unambiguously spoke to the matter,
that is the end of the analysis as neither an administrative body nor the courts may
insert constructions which are contrary to clear legislative intent. 96 However, the
second question addresses when Congress has not spoken directly on the issue: Has
the administrative agency promulgated a rule which is a reasonable interpretation of

89

Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1366 (Fed. Cir.) (Bryson, Circuit Judge, concurring) (“I do
not think it necessary, or particularly helpful, to consider whether those regulations would
be deemed ‘substantive,’ ‘interpretive,’ or ‘procedural’ . . . .”), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
90 Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
91

See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

92

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95–95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).

93

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (“[T]he
courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject
administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that
Congress sought to implement.”).
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congressional intent? 97 The Chevron court held that the EPA made a reasonable
choice in defining ‘stationary source’ and any judgement as to whether it amounts
to good policy or not must be dismissed. 98
V. WHAT IS THE PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD TO USE
DURING AN INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDING?
Another key point of tension in Cuozzo is whose claim construction
standard is proper in an inter partes review; should it be the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard used by the Patent Office or the ‘as understood by those
skilled in the art’ standard used by the courts? A discussion of the policies and
history behind the establishment of each standard is necessary before turning to the
Supreme Court decision in Cuozzo.
A. The Patent Office Uses The Broadest Reasonable
Interpretation Standard When Construing Claim Terms
For more than 100 years the Patent Office has used the broadest reasonable
interpretation in claim construction during patent examination. 99 This practice has
continued uninterrupted since that time even though no patent statute has explicitly
97

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

98 Id. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is
a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a
case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones.”);
see also Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (“Congress . . . left to
the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met.
We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was ‘correct.’ . . . [W]e have no
doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of
Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.”); United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 381–82 (1961) (quoting Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108–09
(1904) (“‘[W]here Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties
requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it involve
questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless he has exceeded his
authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was clearly wrong.’”)); Shimer,
367 U.S. at 383 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned.”).
99 Miel v. Young, 29 App. D.C. 481, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1907) (“This claim should be given the
broadest interpretation which it will support, and we should not strive to import limitations
from the specification to meet the exigencies of the particular situation in which the claim
may stand at a given time.”).
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stated whether the broadest reasonable interpretation should be used by the Patent
Office or not. 100 The purpose for using the broadest reasonable interpretation is to
encourage patent applicants to draft narrowly. 101 This has a two-fold result, first is
to deny the patentee a monopoly on more knowledge than what was actually
invented 102 and second is to “apprise the public of what is still left open to them.” 103
Interestingly, the Patent Office promulgated a rule stating for the first time that this
standard of claim construction was to be used during an inter partes review in
response to the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011. 104
B. The Courts Use the “Ordinary Meaning as Understood by One of
Ordinary Skill in the Art at the Time of the Invention” Standard in Claim
Construction.
As a first principle, it is “the claims of a patent [that] define the invention
to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” 105 It is the individual terms
used when construing the claim that define the scope of the invention. 106
The terms are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” 107 Because
inventors often use specific terminology related to the technological area in which
they work, customary meaning refers to the meaning it would have to one of
ordinary skill in the art. 108 Furthermore, courts have held that inventors are able to
define the claim terms in their specification which have a meaning different than
their ordinary and customary meaning. 109 These points were well stated in
100 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890, 193 L. Ed. 2d 783 (2016), and
aff'd sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 195 L. Ed. 2d 423
(2016).
101 See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128-29 (2014).
102 Id. at 2128–30.
103

Id. at 2129 (quoting MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, 517 U.S. 370, 373
(1996)); MCCLAIN V. ORTMAYER, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891).
104

37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”).
105 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
106 See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to
define the scope of the patented invention.”).
107 Id.
108

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (“It is a well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or
her own lexicographer and thus may use terms in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with
one or more of their ordinary meanings.”) (citation omitted).
109
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Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.: 110
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is
deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an
understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field. The
inventor's words that are used to describe the invention—the
inventor's lexicography—must be understood and interpreted by
the court as they would be understood and interpreted by a person
in that field of technology. Thus the court starts the decision
making process by reviewing the same resources as would that
person, VIZ., the patent specification and the prosecution history.
Thus, the courts use the ‘as understood by those skilled in the art’ standard
because they are tasked with resolving a specific controversy. Frequently, this
dispute revolves around whether a particular invention falls within or out of the
claim scope recited in the patent. Necessarily, the court needs to determine the exact
scope of a claimed invention in order to give the inventor the benefits of a patent to
which he is entitled by right, but no more. To err on either side of this would either
deprive the individual of an earned right granted by the patent system or deprive the
public of the ability to make, use, or sell an invention to which the patent holder had
no right to exclude. In other words, if the courts used the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard (aside from greatly increasing the amount of litigation), this
would unduly restrict a patentee’s rights to the invention and would give the public
rights to knowledge that are otherwise within the scope of the invention.
IV. CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES V. LEE
A. Procedural history
Giuseppe A. Cuozzo applied for a patent on March 18, 2002. The
prosecution of the application continued until February 18, 2004 at which time a
notice of allowance was issued by the Patent Office. 111 More than 8 years had
transpired before Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin USA, Inc. filed a petition
for inter partes review on September 16, 2012 asserting claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent
No. 6,778,074, 112 owned by Cuozzo Speed Technologies, were invalid.
The Patent Trials and Appeal Board instituted an inter partes review on
110

MULTIFORM DESICCANTS, INC. V. MEDZAM, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
111

The prosecution history of the patent application can be found at,
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair; select the ‘PATENT NUMBER’ radio button and
search patent number ‘6,778,074’ (follow “Image File Wrapper” hyperlink).
112

U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074.

40

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

January 9, 2013 because they determined that Garmin was reasonably likely to
prevail on at least one claim of unpatentability. 113 Specifically, the Patent Trials and
Appeal Board denied the petition in part as to claims 1-9, 11-13, 15, 16, and 18-20,
but granted review of claims 10, 14, and 17 on two grounds of unpatentability,
novelty and obviousness. The Patent Trials and Appeal Board rendered a decision
on November 13, 2013, cancelling claims 10, 14, and 17. 114
Briefly, the (‘074) patent claims an indicator and an associated method for
showing a driver his current speed relative to the legal posted speed limit in a given
area that is updated in real time. This is accomplished either through a liquid crystal
display showing both a driver’s speed and the current speed limit or through a
movable needle indicating the driver’s current speed and a colored filter that is
rotatable to show the current speed limit. It is this second implementation, embodied
in claims 10, 14, and 17 that were reviewed and ultimately cancelled. 115
Cuozzo appealed the Patent Trials and Appeal Board decision to the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Patent
Trials and Appeal Board’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard

113

Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. IPR2012-00001, 2013 WL 5947691 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013).

114

Garmin Int'l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d
1852 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2013).
115

U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074, cls. 10, 14, and 17 states:
10. A speed limit indicator comprising:
a global positioning system receiver;
a display controller connected to said global positioning
system receiver, wherein said display controller adjusts
a colored display in response to signals from said
global positioning system receiver to continuously
update the delineation of which speed readings are in
violation of the speed limit at a vehicle’s present
location; and
a speedometer integrally attached to said colored display.
...
14. The speed limit indicator as defined in claim 10,
wherein said colored display is a colored filter.
...
17. The speed limit indicator as defined in claim 14,
wherein said display controller rotates said colored filter
independently of said speedometer to continuously update
the delineation of which speed readings are in violation of
the speed limit at a vehicle’s present location.
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was within their discretion and the decision to initiate the review was final and nonappealable. 116 Cuozzo appealed to the United States Supreme Court and certiorari
was granted.
On appeal Cuozzo argued that the Patent Office improperly granted inter
partes review at least in respect to claims 10 and 14, because Garmin failed to
challenge those claims with specificity. 117 Cuozzo also challenged the decision of
the Patent Trials and Appeal Board to use the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard versus the standard employed by the courts to determine patentability. 118
B. The Majority’s Opinion Holds That the Patent Office’s
Decision to Institute Inter Partes Review Is Not Reviewable
First, in reviewing the Federal Circuit panel decision that the Patent Office’s
institution of an inter partes review was final and non-appealable, the Supreme
Court construed two provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. 119 The
first provision is in reference to the ability of Cuozzo to appeal the Patent Trials and
Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review. The statute states, “No
Appeal.—The determination by the Director [of the Patent Office] whether to
institute inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-appealable.” 120
The second provision is regarding the Patent Office’s ability to promulgate
regulations used in inter partes review. The provision states, “The Director shall
prescribe regulations-- establishing and governing inter partes review under this
chapter and the relationship of such review to other proceedings under this title.” 121
Cuozzo argued review of claims 10 and 14 were improperly granted, because all
challenged claims must be pleaded “with particularity” according to the statute. 122
The Patent Office disagrees and says a mere recitation of the same argument is not
necessary when the claims are “all logically linked,” that the claims “rise and fall”
together, 123 and the same argument is “obviously implied.” 124 Thus, while Cuozzo
has a valid technical argument, logic dictates that if dependent claim 17 is found

116

In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom.
117
118

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016).
Id.

119

Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112–29, Sept. 16, 2011, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
120 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2015).
121

35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015).

122

35 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(3) (2015).

123

See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F. 3d 1268, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

124

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016).

42

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

unpatentable then any claim that subsumes claim 17—claims 10 and 14 here—must
be invalid as well. “Claims which are broad enough to read on obvious subject
matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious subject
matter.” 125
The majority in Cuozzo held—at a minimum—the language in the
provision forbids an appeal that raises some minor statutory technical argument and
nothing more. 126 Furthermore, allowing review of the decision to institute inter
partes review would undermine congressional intent, 127 which specifically grants
the Patent Office authority to re-examine already issued patents. 128 The majority
also points to other similar provisions and patent statutes to support their holding. 129
The Court unanimously holds that using the broadest reasonable claim construction
during an inter partes review is a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s authority
granted by Congress.
Next, Cuozzo argued that the provision requiring the Patent Office to give
a claim “its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
patent in which it appears” 130 is contrary to established law set by the courts which
give claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in the
art.” 131 However, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Patent Office had
within its discretion the ability to use a broadest reasonable claim construction under
35 U.S.C. section 316(a)(4). 132 The Court relied upon Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and United States v. Mead Corporation as
125 Application of Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1972); see also Application of
Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
126 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2015) (stating that the determination by the [Patent Office] whether
to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be FINAL AND
NONAPPEALABLE); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–40.
127

Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140.

128 Id. at 2139–40 (explaining that the statute seeks to “improve patent quality and restore
confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents” (citing H.R. Rep.,
at 45, 48)); 157 Cong. Rec. 9778 (2011) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte) (noting that inter partes
review “screen[s] out bad patents while bolstering valid ones”).
129

Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (limiting appellate review to the “final written decision” (citing
35 U.S.C. § 319)); § 312(c) (2006 ed.) (repealed) (the “determination” that a petition for inter
partes REEXAMINATION “raise[s]” a “substantial new question of patentability” is “final
and non-appealable”)); § 303(c) (2012 ed.); IN RE HINIKER CO., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367
(C.A. Fed.1998) (“Section 303 ... is directed toward the [Patent Office's] authority to institute
a reexamination, and there is no provision granting us direct review of that decision.”).
130

131

37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016).

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015) (granting the Patent Office the authority to promulgate
regulations governing inter partes review).
132

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

43

controlling precedent. 133
Where the clear intent of Congress is articulated and no ambiguity exists
the administrative agency has no discretion. 134 However, when Congress leaves a
gap to be filled, the court interprets this as giving the administrative agency authority
to use reasonable means to carry out the intent of Congress. 135 Because the statute
does not explicitly tell the agency whether to use one standard of claim construction
or another, Congress has implicitly authorized the agency to legislate a reasonable
regulation. 136
Cuozzo argued Congress intended for inter partes review to closely
resemble a court proceeding and, therefore, should employ the same claim
construction that is used by the courts—the Phillips standard. 137 Cuozzo pointed the
Court to the legislative history regarding the inter partes review statutes for
support. 138 The Court emphasized how inter partes review is less like a court action
and more like an administrative proceeding. 139 Furthermore, the Court found the
purpose of inter partes review is not the same as district court litigation. 140
Specifically, Congress wanted to enable the Patent Office to reexamine a previous

133

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
134 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (1984).
135

136

See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218–19 (2001).

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (citing United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“No statutory provision unambiguously directs the
agency to use one standard or the other. And the statute ‘express[ly] . . . authoriz[es] [the
Patent Office] to engage in the process of rulemaking’ to address that gap.”)).
137 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016).
138 Id. at 2143 (2016) (Inter partes review is a “quick and cost effective alternativ[e] to
litigation.” (citing H.R. Rep. at 48))); id. at 46–47 (“The Act converts inter partes
reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding.”); S.Rep. No. 110–
259, p. 20 (2008) (Inter partes review is “a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to
district court litigation.”); 157 Cong. Rec. 3429–3430 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl)
(“Among the reforms that are expected to expedite these proceedings [is] the shift from an
examinational to an adjudicative model”).
139 Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (quoting SIERRA CLUB V. E.P.A., 292
F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to
appear before an administrative agency, once a party seeks review in a federal court, ‘the
constitutional requirement that it have standing kicks in.’”)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“[T]he burden of proof in inter partes review is different
than in the district courts: In inter partes review, the challenger (or the Patent Office) must
establish unpatentability “by a preponderance of the evidence”; in district court, a
challenger must prove invalidity by “clear and convincing evidence”).
140 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
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administrative decision without having to litigate the issue in district court. 141
Finally, the Court conceded this analysis does not shed any light on Congress’s
intent regarding which standard should be applied during an inter partes review. 142
Thus, the correct standard to use remains ambiguous. 143
This resulted in the Court reviewing the regulation only as to whether
designating use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was reasonable or
not. 144 The Court held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s
authority because first, using the broadest reasonable claim construction helps to
ensure that an inventor does not draft too broadly and circumscribe too much
knowledge which unfairly denies from the public the use of information not
contained in the patent 145 and secondly, the Patent Office’s long history of
employing the broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction in agency
determinations without congressional comment for not only reviewing patent
applications, but also other related proceedings. 146
Cuozzo responds with two arguments. The first is that the process is unfair
and points to the scarcity of successful claim amendments made during an inter
partes review proceeding. The Court rejects Cuozzo’s statistical argument and
retorts, “these numbers may reflect the fact that no amendment could save the
inventions at issue, I.E., that the patent should have never issued at all.” 147 The
Court noted that they did not consider whether the manner in which the Patent Office
exercises its authority is compliant with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), 148 because Cuozzo
did not explicitly raise this issue. 149
Cuozzo’s second argument raises the issue that having two
standards of claim construction, one for administrative proceedings and one in the
courts, may result in inconsistent results and confusion. 150 The Court agrees with
141 Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)) (“[I]nter partes review helps protect the public's ‘paramount
interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within their legitimate scope.’”); see
H.R. Rep., at 39–40 (Inter partes review is an “efficient system for challenging patents that
should not have issued.”).
142 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
143

Id.
Id. at 2144–45.
145 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); NAUTILUS, INC. V. BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS,
INC., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014); see also IN RE YAMAMOTO, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
144

146

See supra, notes 93–98 and accompanying text; Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136
S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2016).
147 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2145.
148 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011) (“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”).
149 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2146.
150 Id. at 2146.
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Cuozzo on the one hand that this is a possibility. 151 On the other hand, this has long
been the case in the United States patent system which provides two different tracks,
one in the courts and one in the Patent Office, and consolidating the claim
construction standard would prove difficult. 152
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas argued the holding in Chevron should be overturned and
that “ambiguity in a statutory term is best construed as an implicit delegation of
power to an administrative agency to determine the bounds of the law” is false. 153
Justice Thomas proposed revisiting Chevron and its descendants in an appropriate
case. 154 He concurred in full with the decision, but only on the grounds that it is
compliant with 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). 155
D. Justice Alito’s Dissent and Justice Sotomayor Joins
Justice Alito began with the strong presumption for judicial review. 156 He
agreed Congress has given the Patent Office considerable authority to promulgate
its own rules regarding inter partes review. 157 He disagreed congressional intent was
to bar judicial review of whether the Patent Office exceeded its authority or not
when instituting an inter partes review – the only limitation is that a challenge to the
agency’s decision must be channeled through the agency’s final decision. 158
The dissent points out that a number of statutory requirements need to be

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2149–50 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part); see Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645,
1651 (2015) (“Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to
federal agencies. For that reason, this Court applies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial
review of administrative action.”).
157 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2148–49.
158

Id. at 2149.
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satisfied in order for the Patent Office to institute an inter partes review. 159 The
dissent also pointed to LINDAHL V. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
to illustrate the strong presumption of judicial review. 160 In Lindahl, the Court held
that even though congressional intent was repeated three times in one sentence
regarding finality, the statute could be read as final only to factual determinations
and not to questions of law. 161 The dissent notes that Congress employs far stronger
language when it intends to prohibit judicial review altogether. 162 Previous cases
have held that final agency decisions, while not reviewable at the time (no
interlocutory appeals), are nonetheless still subject to judicial review upon final
judgment. 163 The dissent emphasizes that this judicial review upon a final judgment
of agency decisions is standard practice, including review of earlier agency

159

Compare 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2015) (stating that a petition must, “identif[y], in writing
and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each
claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”),
and 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1), (b) (2015) (A petition may not be advanced by a party who either
filed an action claiming invalidity or was itself sued for infringement more than one year
earlier.), and 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2015) (The petition must show that, “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
in the petition.”), with Brief for Respondent at 16, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.
Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1298034, at *16 (“By barring judicial review of all
institution decisions, § 314(d) does not allow the Board to ignore the limits on its authority.
Even when Congress intends to bar judicial review of an agency decision, this Court and
others have recognized ‘an implicit and narrow exception’ for ‘claims that the agency
exceeded the scope of its delegated authority or violated a clear statute mandate.’ Achates,
803 F.3d at 658–59 . . . . This exception has no application here, however, because
requirements such as § 312's ‘particularity’ rule are not clear statutory limits on the Board's
authority to declare patent claims unpatentable. These requirements are instead claimsprocessing rules that speak to the petitioner's procedural obligations, not the Board's
adjudicative power.”).
160

161

Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768 (1985).

See id. at 779.
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016) (“‘[W]hen Congress
intends to bar judicial review altogether, it typically employs language far more
unambiguous and comprehensive,’ giving as an example a statute that made an agency
decision ‘final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law or
fact’ and ‘not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by
mandamus or otherwise.’” (quoting Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 779–80
& n. 13 (1985))).
163 See MOHAWK INDUS., INC. V. CARPENTER, 558 U.S. 100, 105 & n.1, 109
(2009) (agreeing with decisions holding that attorney-client privilege rulings are
“nonappealable” because “post judgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of
litigants”); COOPERS & LYBRAND V. LIVESAY, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 472 & n.17
(1978) (describing an order denying class certification as “nonappealable” but noting that it
“is subject to effective review after final judgment.”).
162
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decisions that were not reviewable at the time. 164 In contrast, the majority analogized
to cases in other contexts where the court has held that review of preliminary
decisions are unreviewable. 165 Justice Alito countered the majority employs the
wrong analogy. 166
Despite the general presumption for judicial review, Justice Alito
acknowledged that review may not be appropriate in every case. 167 He went on to
write that although Cuozzo may have ultimately failed, due to lack of any prejudice
the decision had on his case, the perceived weakness in Cuozzo’s suit should not bar
review by a court. 168 By not allowing review, he argued the Court has set up the
potential for unfairness to the patentee. 169 For example, if the Patent Office does not
follow the statutes when instituting inter partes review or any of the other post grant
proceedings, the majority decision in Cuozzo makes this unreviewable. 170 He opined
this surely could not have been Congress’s intent. 171
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AFTER CUOZZO
The result after Cuozzo is a continuation of the slow trend of granting the
Patent Office more rule-making authority especially relating to activities carried out
within the agency itself. This is discussed extensively below. Another alternative is
164 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2011) (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); 15A
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3905.1, pp.
250, 252 (2d ed. 1992) (“[T]he general rule that an appeal from final judgment ... permits
review of all rulings that led up to the judgment” and “[t]he variety of orders open to review
on subsequent appeal from a final judgment is enormous.”).
165

See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“The grand jury
gets to say—without any review, oversight, or second-guessing—whether probable cause
exists to think that a person committed a crime.” (quoting Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1090, 1097–98 (2014))).
166 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 & n.7 (2016) (“[The majority]
draws the wrong analogy for this case. Cuozzo's complaint is that the petition for inter
partes review did not articulate its challenge to certain patent claims with adequate
particularity. This is more akin to an argument that an indictment did not sufficiently allege
an offense and provide notice of the charges against the defendant, which is reviewable
after trial and judgment.”); Id. at n.7 (overturning a conviction based on the insufficiency of
the indictment (citing United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612–613 (1882))).
167 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2011) (“[T]he court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited
by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”).
168
169

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.

170

Id.

171

Id.
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an almost complete deference given to the Patent Office under Chevron as long as
the Patent Office’s interpretation is compliant with 5 U.S.C. § 706. This possibility
is addressed briefly below. 172
A. Will Courts Grant Complete Deference to the Patent Office Going
Forward?
There are strong arguments that Cuozzo establishes the precedent for
almost complete deference. In other contexts, Chevron deference has been widely
applied giving agencies broad discretion in interpreting congressional intent. 173 This
discretion has been extended to apply even where the court has already spoken on
the matter. 174 It has been argued that the fundamental reason why courts should defer
to agency discretion is because Congress has told them to do so. 175 Nonetheless, this
broad discretion raises some important separation of powers questions and suggests
that it is the administrative agency who is the final arbiter to say what the law is. 176
Chevron deference has even been suggested to give agencies authority similar to
McCulloch v. Maryland to do as they please as long their interpretation of

172

173

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

See, e.g., Luminant Generation Co. LLC v. U.S. EPA, 714 F.3d 841, 852–53 (5th Cir.
2013) (using the two step analysis under Chevron held that congress didn’t speak directly to
the issue and the agency’s interpretation of congressional intent was permissible);
VERIZON COMMC’NS INC. V. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 468 (2002) (‘[T]he incumbents have
not met their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference [under Chevron]
due the FCC.”).
174 In AT&T CORP. V. PORTLAND, the Ninth Circuit held that cable modem service is a
“telecommunications service.” 216 F.3d 871, 878 (2002). The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) then made a declaratory ruling which determined it had “appropriately
classified [broadband cable modem service] as an ‘information service’ [that] does not
contain a distinct telecommunications service.” In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed
Access to Internet over Cable and Other Facilities (Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling), 17
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4847 (2002). The Ninth Circuit subsequently heard the appeal for the
declaratory ruling and based its holding on stare decisis from Portland. The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit in Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs. The Court said that even if ‘telecommunications service’ was the best reading of the
statute, the Commissioner’s interpretation is still entitled to Chevron deference if it is a
reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, “A court's prior construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion.” 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2690–91 (2005).
175 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 196–98 (2006) (stating
that other proposed reasons such as administrative experts being able to interpret
congressional intent better than judges; agency decisions require policy judgments and are
better suited for the political rather than the judicial branches of government; or executive
interpretations should be given deference based on a separation of powers argument, have
been displaced by the simple statement, because congress has told the judiciary to give
deference, they should do so).
176 Contra Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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congressional intent is reasonable. 177 Justice Antonin Scalia once opined, “I tend to
think, however, that in the long run Chevron will endure and be given its full scope
. . . because it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more
adequately serves its needs.” 178
However, Chevron is not without its critics, indicating there is at least some
pushback to agency deference. One does not need to look any further than Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Cuozzo. 179 Justice Thomas has been a vocal critic of
Chevron and the cases decided based on its doctrine. 180 Still others have questioned
the prudence of Chevron as well. 181 Given the historical precedent set by the past
practice of the Federal Circuit to interpret the substantive patent laws, 182 any
deference given to the Patent Office will be limited to the new post-grant review
proceedings. 183 Congress would need to expressly tell the courts if its intent is to
change this and determine that it should also defer to the agency when interpreting
the substantive patent laws, such as sections 101 – 103. 184

177 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 353 (1819) (“The power to establish such a corporation is implied,
and involved in the grant of specific powers in the constitution; because the end involves
the means necessary to carry it into effect. A power without the means to use it, is a nullity.
. . . [T]he constitution . . . expressly gives to congress the power ‘to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers . . . or in any
department or officer thereof.”).
178 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 520 (1989).
179 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, concurring).
180 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–25 (2015) (Thomas,
concurring) (“This line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the
Framers sought to prevent.”).
181 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Is CHEVRON's Game Worth the Candle? Burning
Interpretation at Both Ends, in LIBERTY'S NEMESIS 57, 69 (D. Reuter & J. Yoo eds., 2016)
(“Perhaps the best course at this point is to scrap the Chevron framework and return to the
terms laid out in the APA’s Section 706.”); DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE
SUPREME COURT, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 7 (2016)
(“[I]nstead of fulfilling one of the highest aims of civil society—providing a remedy for
unlawful government conduct—the Supreme Court betrays that lofty aspiration and clothes
the denial of a remedy in a technical legal doctrine permitting the executive officials who
may have committed an unlawful act to escape judicial accountability.”).
182

See discussion supra Section II.

183

See discussion supra Section III.

184

35 U.S.C. §§ 101 – 103 (2012).
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B. The Patent Office Gains a Small Foothold Toward the Deference
Accorded to Other Administrative Agencies
The reading of Cuozzo results in a continuation of the slow trend of
deference granted to the Patent Office. Historical practice has been for the courts
not to accede deference to the Patent Office to the same extent as other agencies. 185
The courts by and large have retained their claim to reviewing Patent Office
decisions and reversing when they conflict with the court’s interpretation of the
patent statutes—with some notable exceptions. 186 Cuozzo continues this slow trend
by explicitly holding that Chevron deference is controlling. 187
However, this ruling should not be seen as setting a new standard for court
deference to the Patent Office; deference will remain dissimilar to that given to other
government agencies. A narrowly construed application of Cuozzo to future cases
is the result. First, the facts in Cuozzo lent themselves to defeat. Axiomatically, if a
dependent claim is invalidated because it is not novel, then by definition any claim
subsuming the dependent claim must also be invalid due to lack of novelty. It is
hard to see how Cuozzo was prejudiced based on the appeal presented; even the
dissent made specific reference to the weakness of Cuozzo’s arguments. 188 Thus,
not only was prejudice against Cuozzo regarding institution of inter partes review
difficult to find, but so also was prejudice regarding the Patent Office’s use of the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard. While a patent claim could at least
theoretically be valid using the court’s ‘as understood by those skilled in the art’
standard, but invalid using the Patent Office’s broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, this would be a rare instance. It is most likely that Cuozzo’s claim would
have been invalidated even using the court’s less stringent standard.
However, the dissent is writing with an eye toward future cases and asks,
“[If a Patent Office decision] grossly exceed[s] the Patent Office's authority and
would be manifestly prejudicial to the patent owner, [could] Congress really have
intended to shield such shenanigans from judicial scrutiny?” 189 The majority
emphasizes their analysis is employed only when the decision by the Patent Office
to institute inter partes review is closely tied to those corresponding patent
185

See, e.g., In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Sarah Tran, Patent
Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 616 (2012) (“[The Federal Circuit] has assumed
exclusive responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act.”); Sapna
Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2011) (“The
Federal Circuit treats appeals from patent agencies differently than those from non-patent
agencies. The Federal Circuit has granted Chevron or the lesser Skidmore deference to
decisions from all of its non-patent agencies. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has historically
chosen not to defer to agencies on issues of patent law.”).
186 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (“[T]he Federal Circuit must use the
framework set forth in [5 U.S.C.A. § 706].”).
187 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
188 Id. at 2154 (“Assuming that Cuozzo must show prejudice from the error it alleges, it is
hard to see how Cuozzo could do so here. . . . But any perceived weakness in the merits of
Cuozzo's appeal does not mean that such issues are unworthy of judicial review.”).
189 Id. at 2155.
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statutes. 190 Further, if due process or other constitutional issues are raised by a future
litigant, this holding would not impede judicial review of such a case. 191 Thus, the
holding in Cuozzo is quite narrow.
Limiting the effect of the Cuozzo decision even further is the fact that the
Court used the rule-making authority granted by Congress cabined within the postgrant review patent statutes. 192 The Patent Office’s rule-making ability has
historically been limited to only procedural matters. For the first time, Congress has
granted the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority, meaning they can use
certain policies identified by Congress 193 to promulgate their own rules regarding
these post-grant review proceedings and certain other proceedings. 194 This same
rule-making authority has not been extended to the other patent statutes which
would threaten the holdings in thousands of cases that have interpreted the core
patent statutes establishing patentability—namely, sections 101, 102, 103, and
112. 195
C. Would the Court Defer to the Patent Office when interpreting Section
102?
For example, prior to the America Invents Act, section 102(b) of the patent
statutes would bar a patent from issue if the invention was ‘on sale.’ 196 Case law has
already interpreted the on-sale bar to include sales that involve non-public informing
uses. 197 However, when Congress rewrote section 102 for the America Invents Act,
they changed the statutory language. 198 The Patent Office has penned an opinion
190

Id. at 2141.
Id. at 2141–42 (2016) (“Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not
categorically preclude review of a final decision where . . . there is a due process problem
with the entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its
statutory limits. . . . Such “shenanigans” may be properly reviewable in the context of § 319
and under the Administrative Procedure Act, which enables reviewing courts to “set aside
agency action” that is “contrary to constitutional right,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,”
or “arbitrary [and] capricious.”).
192 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2015).
193 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2015) (“(b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under this
section, the Director shall consider the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the
integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of
the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”).
194 Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 640–44 (2012).
195 See id. at 615.
196 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952) (“[T]he invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or ‘on sale’ in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”) (emphasis
added).
191

197

See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520
(2d Cir. 1946) (“[I]t is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he shall not
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself
with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”).
198 35 U.S.C.A. § 102, supra, note 5.
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that the ‘on sale’ bar now only applies to inventions that are publically informing
and does not apply to sales that do not teach the public how to practice the
invention. 199 Thus, in the Patent Office’s opinion, Metalizing Engineering is no
longer good law because the sale in that case did not disclose to the public how the
invention was made.
The courts are likely to give little if any weight to the Patent Office’s
opinion even under Cuozzo. First, as previously discussed, the historical practice
has been for the federal circuit to interpret the patent statutes regarding substantive
rules and only to give deference when the Patent Office interprets a procedural
matter that takes place within the Patent Office. Second, the issue of whether or not
an invention was ‘on sale’ only comes up in litigation. 200 Not only does the Patent
Office not have any experience in adjudicating these cases, but also would not have
ruled on any cases that, at least arguably, the court would need to give deference.
Lastly, when Congress passed the America Invents Act, the only substantive rule
making authority conferred to the Patent Office was in regards to the post grant
review proceedings. 201 Congress could have explicitly extended this authority to the
other patent statutes as well if it had intended to do so. Therefore, the courts are the
appropriate interpreters of the new section 102 patent statute—not the Patent Office.
Based on policy arguments, the courts will not overturn Metallizing
Engineering and will continue to hold that non-informing public sales also bar
patentability. 202 The courts have interpreted the patent statutes to require a decision
by an inventor early on to either apply for a patent or to designate the invention as
a trade secret. This is to prevent an inventor from extending the right to exclude
others from practicing the invention beyond the statutory limit of 20 years. The
courts have consistently held that this is the primary reason that patents are denied
when an applicant has commercialized its invention outside the grace period. 203
D. The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Should Not Be Used in an Inter
199

MPEP § 2152.02(d) (“The phrase ‘on sale’ in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) is treated as having
the same meaning as ‘on sale’ in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b), except that the sale must make
the invention available to the public.”) (emphasis added).
200

See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518
(2d Cir. 1946).

201

202

35 U.S.C. §§ 300 – 329 (2012).

See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1370, n.11
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“A primary rationale of the on-sale bar is that publicly offering a product
for sale that embodies the claimed invention places it in the public domain, regardless of
when or whether actual delivery occurs.”). The Helsinn Court explained that requiring the
details of the claimed invention be publicly disclosed before the on-sale bar is triggered
“would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to
those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.” Id. at 1369 (citing
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829)).
203 See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520
(2d Cir. 1946); The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887).
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Partes Review Proceeding
The Patent Office’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
during an inter partes review proceeding is not a reasonable interpretation of
Congressional intent under Chevron. When a statute is ambiguous, any
administrative rule applying the statute must be a reasonable interpretation of
Congressional intent. 204 Otherwise, it is invalid. The broadest reasonable
interpretation standard has historically been used during the pendency of a patent
application in front of the Patent Office where the claims are amended in an iterative
process. The use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard when construing
claims has a two-fold purpose. First, it is to eliminate any ambiguity in the claim
language so that the public may understand exactly what knowledge is protected by
the patent claims and what remains open to them. Secondly, the purpose is to limit
the scope of the invention to only encompass what the inventor actually created—
and no more. These overriding considerations are in place to protect the public and
any perceived injury to the patent applicant is alleviated by his ability to amend the
claims.
This is analogous to the specificity requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112. An
invention needs to be described completely and with specificity such that a person
of ordinary skill in the art could make and use the invention. The patent system is a
compromise designed to incentivize the invention process where an inventor
receives the right to exclude others from practicing the invention in exchange for
disclosing the knowledge of the invention to the public. It is this disclosure by the
inventor to the public that is deemed by Congress to be worthy of the social costs
associated with granting an inventor a monopoly in the invention even if for a
limited time. However, Congress has explicitly allowed a patent to be reviewed
during an inter partes review with respect to sections 102 or 103 only—not 101 or
112. Implicit in this decision is that any deficiencies with respect to those sections
should have already been addressed and will give deference to the Patent Office’s
initial determination regarding those sections. Therefore, issues within those
sections can only be raised in district court.
Similarly, any issues arising from using the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard should already be addressed by the time the patent is
challenged in an inter partes review proceeding. It is difficult to understand how a
patent, that is challenged eight years after it has been issued, in an inter partes review
furthers the public interest of removing ambiguity from the language or limiting the
scope of the invention through the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard. That is not to say that if prior art is introduced that reads on the claim the
claims should not be limited, only that using the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard is not the appropriate mechanism to achieve this. Any claim scope already
determined to be patentable using the broadest reasonable interpretation, similar to
section 112 determinations, should be given the same deference as a previously
adjudicated agency decision. Thus, the Patent Office’s use of the broadest
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See 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1966); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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reasonable interpretation during inter partes review is not a reasonable interpretation
of Congressional intent. The Patent Office should employ the standard used by the
courts, “as understood by a person of skill in the art.” 205
Instead, in Cuozzo, the Patent Office essentially raised the issue de novo
during the inter partes review proceeding and gave no weight to their own examiners
previous decision. As already discussed, the use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation does not further the public interests after the patent has already issued.
In fact, it undermines confidence in the Patent Office when a determination is made
by an administrative agent (patent examiner) and then given no deference within the
same agency. The use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard during an
inter partes review additionally places an undue hardship on the patentee. Again, the
purpose of using the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is to encourage an
applicant to remove ambiguous language and narrow the claim scope to only cover
the invention that was created through an iterative process. This iterative process is
absent in an inter partes review and thus the patentee only gets one chance to amend
his claims by motion to the Patent and Trademark Administration Board. The record
to date shows that it is not much of a chance at that. Because the unnecessary
burdens placed on a patentee substantially outweigh any benefit to the public by
using the broadest reasonable interpretation during an inter partes review, the Patent
Office should instead employ the “as understood by one of skill in the art” standard
used by courts during an inter partes review proceeding. 206
E. Two Different Outcomes in Different Settings
The court concedes the fact that two different outcomes are possible, one
outcome within the Patent Office and a different outcome in district court. 207
However, the Court fails to address the issues raised by this scheme. The first issue
is the inherent unfairness experienced by the patentee discussed above. The second
issue is the potential for excess litigation. 208 Having even the potential for different
outcomes in different forums encourages forum shopping and other undesirable
behaviors by litigants. The last issue is the potential for economic dislocation.
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Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016).
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Id. at 2139.
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Id. at 2146 (2016) (“We recognize that [the possibility of different outcomes] is so. This
possibility, however, has long been present in our patent system, which provides different
tracks—one in the Patent Office and one in the courts—for the review and adjudication of
patent claims. As we have explained above, inter partes review imposes a different burden
of proof on the challenger. These different evidentiary burdens mean that the possibility of
inconsistent results is inherent to Congress' regulatory design.”).
208 STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG. 2D SESSION, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM (1958) (Fritz Machlup) (noting that two different standards applied in
different forums will likely greatly increase litigation).
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VIII. THE COURT IN CUOZZO GOT IT WRONG
A. Because legislative intent was not ambiguous, the Court should not have
employed Chevron to decide the case.
Congress clearly stated in the legislative history that its intent was that
post-grant review proceedings were to be more like litigation in court rather than
historical adjudications performed solely within the agency.
B. The Court should have ruled in favor of Cuozzo based on Administrative
Law principles
The Court all but says explicitly that if Cuozzo would have argued the case
on administrative law grounds, the case would have come out differently. The Court
says, “Cuozzo does not contend that the decision not to allow its amendment is
‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious,’ or ‘otherwise [un]lawful,’” 209 in reference to the Patent
Office denying Cuozzo’s attempt to amend the claims. This applies equally well to
Cuozzo not raising the same issue in regards to the Patent Office’s decision to
institute inter partes review regarding claims 10 and 14. 210
Even the majority agreed non-reviewable decisions can be reviewed if it
raises any constitutional issue. 211 Just as importantly, the Court has held that
agencies must be constrained to making decisions within their jurisdictional purview
and that agency discretion does not apply when they act outside of their
jurisdiction. 212 In Cuozzo, when the Patent Office instituted inter partes review of
claims 10 and 14, they acted outside of their jurisdictional authority and therefore
had no discretion to institute review of those claims. The statute states, “[t]he
Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director
determines that the information presented in the petition . . . .” 213 The statute clearly
limits claims and issues to be limited to those raised in the petition. The Patent
Office does not have any jurisdictional authority to raise issues outside of those
presented in the petition. If Congress had wanted the Patent Office to be able to raise
issues outside of the four corners of the petition, it would have said so.
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Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(a) (1966).
210 Id. at 2156.
211
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Id. at 2141-42.

See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 544 (1988) (“The agency has no
discretion to deviate from [] mandated procedure. . . . When a suit charges an agency with
failing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function
exception does not apply.”).
213 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2011).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The decision in Cuozzo establishes, at least regarding the post-grant review
of patent proceedings, that the courts will defer to the Patent Office’s interpretation
of congressional intent as long as its interpretation is reasonable. This has not been
extended and is unlikely to be in the near future to the core statutes regarding
patentability-sections 101, 102, 103, and 112. The Court rightly points out that
Congress has constructed the patent statutes in this way and the Court should not
substitute their judgment in its place. Although there are good arguments as to why
this may be a good rule, there are also strong arguments against. The Court seems
to be conceding that an administrative agency is a better ‘judge’ in interpreting
congressional intent. 214 The Court does not seem to acknowledge the inherent
problems of improper influences that may present themselves that are unrelated to
underlying congressional policy considerations or that compel an agency to not keep
fidelity to the Constitution such as concerns about retaining influence and power as
an agency, political pressures outside the scope of the statute in question, or denying
substantive due process to applicants in the name of efficiency. Effectively
relegating administrative rules to rational basis review by courts of interpretive
questions seems to defer to the agencies the power to say what the law is and only
the underlying statute circumscribes that interpretation. If that interpretation is
reasonable, then the judiciary does not have the power to review it.

214 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“In
these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is
technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by
these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not
consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.”).
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